装备保障信息分类与代码设计研究

根据装备保障信息化建设的需要,分析了装备保障信息的特点,探讨了信息分类的要求并提出了装备保障信息分类方法;阐述了装备保障信息代码设计的要求、分类、形式．提出了代码设计方法。     

信息化条件下装备保障组织变革的新逻辑

分析了装备保障组织作为一个开放的复杂系统,面对信息化所带来的巨大变化,其结构变革的必然性以及变革所要遵循的基本原则,指出了信息化时代装备保障组织所应具有的基本特征。     

信息错误检测项目的关系分析

从提高信息质量这一目标入手,定义了理论信息错误类别空间、可检测信息错误类别空间、检测项目集等基础概念,分析了检测项目集之间的对等、相交、包含和互斥等4种关系及其特点,形成了信息错误检测项目集的2种生成与优化方式,以及若干优化原则,并给出各原则的优先顺序。     

信息安全保障与信息作战的关系探究

为了给信息作战计划的制定、行动的实施提供安全保障指导,探讨了信息安全保障与信息作战(IO)之间的关系,以几种典型信息作战要素和信息作战空间的三个层次为对象,详细分析了信息安全保障与二者之间的关系。为军队信息安全保障体系的建立提供一定理论支持。     

现代机载探测系统多源信息融合算法

针对机载探测系统的特性,应用Dempster-Shafer(D-S)证据理论和主观Bayes的组合算法,对来自机载SAR雷达、机载前视红外搜索跟踪系统(IRS)、电子支援系统(ESM)等探测系统多次观测所获得的数据,以及来自地面的电子情报(ELINT)的不同信息进行实时融合、识别,进而确定攻击对象.通过实例进行仿真证明,这种组合算法适用于不同类传感器和不同格式信息间的融合,适合于复杂信号环境.     

Emergency transshipment in decentralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests

While there has been significant previous literature on inventory transshipment, most research has focused on the dealers' demand filling decision (when to fill transshipment requests from other dealers), ignoring the requesting decision (when to send transshipment requests to other dealers). In this paper we develop optimal inventory transshipment policies that incorporate both types of decisions. We consider a decentralized system in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer and of each other. We first study a network consisting of a very large number of dealers. We prove that the optimal inventory and transshipment decisions for an individual dealer are controlled by threshold rationing and requesting levels. Then, in order to study the impact of transshipment among independent dealers in a smaller dealer network, we consider a decentralized two‐dealer network and use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium inventory strategies of the individual dealers. An extensive numerical study highlights the impact of the requesting decision on the dealers' equilibrium behavior in a decentralized setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

确定性理论在雷达型号识别中的应用

雷达型号识别是雷达对抗情报侦察的首要工作,是近一步分析雷达用途及相关武器系统的基础,也是高层次上的态势评估和威胁估计的主要依据.针对现代战争中电磁信号环境的复杂性,利用单一传感器很难对雷达型号进行准确识别,而基于确定性理论的不确定推理技术能将多个传感器在多个周期的侦察信息进行融合,所以采用确定性理论的数据融合技术,基于确定性理论的组合规则,采用分层式融合算法对雷达型号进行识别.仿真结果表明,该方法的识别结果令人满意,使采用单一传感器可能存在的无法识别或误识别等现象得到了明显的改善.     

架构和模式在水声信息流仿真软件中的应用

水声信息流仿真软件系统涉及多目标、多声纳以及多变的海洋环境.仿真软件的复用性是现代软件工程的重要性能指标.针对系统开放性的特点,在领域分析模型的基础上,采用了面向对象方法设计仿真软件模型.为了满足软件多层次复用的需求,应用软件架构技术和设计模式设计仿真软件.根据水声信息流仿真软件需求,系统划分为四层结构;按功能,层又可分解为包.可复用的设计模式用于设计不同层和包中类之间的关系.提出的仿真软件模型具有良好的可扩充性与可复用性.     

Security,autonomy and defense burdens: The effects of alliance membership in the 19th and 20th centuries

This paper investigates the effect of alliance membership on the defense burdens of major powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. We hypothesize that the reactions of states to alliance membership will be different in the pre‐nuclear and nuclear eras. Possession of nuclear weapons by allies makes the security provided by the alliance more akin to a collective good than is the case in the pre‐nuclear era. States join alliances for two reasons: security and autonomy. The effects of each of these concerns are identified. We include in our model such alliance‐level factors as the power equivalence of the allies and the number of states in the alliance. We also look at state‐level variables such as power position within the alliance. We conclude that the nuclear period generally operates as the free‐rider principle would posit, while models based on “complementarity of effort” are more applicable in the earlier period.     

“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.